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LEAVING YOUR SPEECH RIGHTS AT THE BAR-Gentile v.
State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
Lester Porter, Jr.
Abstract" In Gentile v. State Bar the Supreme Court voided an attorney disciplinary
rule regulating trial publicity for vagueness. The Court, however, upheld the substantive
standard employed by the rule to identify dangerous speech. This standard restricts more
attorney comments to the media than the Court has allowed for the press or public. This
Note argues that the standard upheld in Gentile fails First Amendment scrutiny and pro-
poses a response for states reviewing their professional disciplinary rules in light of Gentile.
Adoption of this proposal will mitigate the danger of prejudicial trial publicity while rec-
ognizing the benefits of attorney publicity.
On February 2, 1987, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police sheriff
reported to the media that his undercover drug officers had found four
kilograms of cocaine and $300,000 in traveller's checks missing from a
sting operation.1 The local press followed the subsequent investigation
eagerly, reporting the sheriff's confidence in his officers and the inves-
tigation's focus on Grady Sanders. Sanders owned the vault company
where the drugs and money were stored. The story became even more
sensational over the course of the next year as additional people with
drug connections reported money missing from Sanders' vaults. In
February of 1988, the prosecutor finally indicted Sanders.
On the eve of the prosecutor's announcement, Sanders' attorney,
Dominic Gentile, debated his options. On the one hand, after con-
ducting his own investigation, Gentile believed that Sanders was a
scapegoat for a corrupt police detective hooked on cocaine. Gentile
believed that if he held a press conference to inform the media of his
findings, he could stem the flow of negative publicity surrounding
Sanders, publicity that had forced Sanders' vault company to close, his
other business interests to stumble, and his health to suffer. On the
other hand, Gentile realized that a press conference could violate
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 which limits what attorneys can say
to the media out of a concern for prejudice of potential jurors.2
Gentile went forward with the press conference, but in a manner
deliberately designed to minimize prejudice to the trial. Gentile lim-
ited his comments, giving only the general outlines of his police-cor-
ruption defense. He also refused to answer many of the reporters'
questions, citing his professional responsibility.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all facts are taken from Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in
Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2727-30 (1991) (Kennedy, J.).
2. NEv. Sup. CT. R. 177. See infra note 57 for text of the rule.
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The local court impaneled a jury in August. None of the jurors had
any recollection of Gentile's comments to the media. During the trial,
Gentile supported every material allegation he had made in the press
conference. The jury acquitted Sanders of all counts.
Gentile was not as successful with the State Bar as he was in the
courtroom.' After the trial, the State Bar of Nevada filed a complaint
against Gentile alleging a violation of Rule 177. The Southern Nevada
Disciplinary Board of the State Bar held a hearing on the matter and
recommended a private reprimand. Gentile waived the confidentiality
of the disciplinary hearing and appealed to the Nevada Supreme
Court, which affirmed the findings of the Board. Gentile took his case
to the United States Supreme Court.
In Gentile v. State Bar,4 the Supreme Court cleared Gentile of the
disciplinary charges but upheld the principle that attorneys do not
have the same speech rights as the public or the press. Writing for a
five-member majority on the issue of vagueness, Justice Kennedy
explained that section (c) of Rule 177, a list of exceptions to the gen-
eral bar on statements to the press, was confusing to the average law-
yer and thus the entire rule was void for vagueness.5 However, Chief
Justice Rehnquist persuaded four of his colleagues to join him on the
issue of the state's power to regulate attorney speech, declaring that
the standard employed in the main body of the rule was a legal restric-
tion on speech despite the First Amendment. Unlike the press or the
general public, the Chief Justice explained, attorneys can be punished
for comments that do not pose a clear and preseat danger to a fair
trial.6
This Note argues that states should reject the analysis of the
Supreme Court and provide attorneys with the sarae free speech pro-
tection as the media and other individuals. Setting Gentile against the
background of the Supreme Court's twin goals of free speech and fair
trials highlights several inadequacies in the Rehnquist analysis and
suggests a proposed response for states reviewing their professional
disciplinary rules. Adoption of this proposal will maximize the poten-
tial benefits of attorney involvement in trial publicity while respecting
the constitutional mandate of fair adjudications.7
3. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2723.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2731-32.
6. Id. at 2744.
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FAIR TRIALS AND FREE
SPEECH
The shifting majority in Gentile is the most recent attempt by the
Court to accommodate two constitutional interests, fair trials and free
speech, that provide little room for compromise.' Over the last few
decades, the Cou-t has protected judicial impartiality and freedom of
speech with equal zeal.9 However, the competition between the two
principles is also responsible for the ambiguous dicta from the Court's
landmark decision in this area, Sheppard v. Maxwell 10 The problems
resulting from this competition are evident in the struggle of the bench
and bar to implement rules and procedures protecting both interests.
A. Protecting Argument Within and Without the Courtroom
To safeguard impartiality in the judicial process, the Supreme Court
has followed the principle that a court may base its decisions only on
evidence and argument offered within the courtroom.11 For criminal
trials, this principle flows from the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an
impartial jury trial for all criminal defendants,12 as a protection
against government oppression. For civil trials, the Seventh Amend-
ment preserves the right to a jury, but does not repeat the guarantee of
impartiality granted in the Sixth Amendment.1 The significance of
this difference is unclear, but the absence of the word "impartial" may
justify lower safeguards for civil trials. 4
The Supreme Court is equally protective of the freedom of argu-
ment outside the courtroom. Implementing the command of the First
Amendment, 5 the Supreme Court has developed several rigorous
principles to scrutinize statutes and regulations that attempt to restrict
speech. For example, the Court considers prior restraints on speech
presumptively invalid because of their tendency to freeze political
debate. 6 The Court also voids restrictions that are unduly vague
8. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 611-12 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
9. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
10. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
11. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
12. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. "In suits at common law... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... " Id. amend.
VII.
14. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976).
15. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ... 
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
16. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
735
Washington Law Review
because they may fail to give fair notice to those impacted and may
facilitate discriminatory enforcement. 17 Similarly, the Court strikes
down regulations that are overly broad in sweeping both protected and
unprotected speech under their ambit. 18
However, the Court has never held that the freedom of speech guar-
anteed by the First Amendment is an absolute right. 9 In Schenck v.
United States,20 Justice Holmes formulated the "clear and present
danger" test to delineate the exception to free speech.21  This test
focuses on whether the seriousness and imminence of a danger created
by the speech can overcome the interest in the speech's protection.22
More recently, the Court has created discrete categories of speech
that states may more readily regulate when faced with compelling gov-
ernment interests.2" After determining that the speech fits within one
of these categories, the Court applies a two-prong test to determine the
constitutionality of the regulation. First, the regulation must further a
substantial and important government interest unrelated to the sup-
pression of speech.24 In advancing those interests, the suppression
must not center on the identity of the speaker2" but may account for
the special characteristics of the environment.26 Second, the limitation
may be no greater than necessary to accomplish the government's
interest.2 7 This second prong requires precise drafting of the speech
regulation,28 a demonstrable relationship between the goal and the
means chosen,29  and the consideration of any less restrictive
alternatives.30
17. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1983).
18. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
19. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950).
20. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21. Id. at 52.
22. See United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
23. See, eg., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding a protective order
that restricted the publishing of information received during discovery to protect the integrity of
the discovery process); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (apholding restrictions on
speech rights of prisoners because of the special needs of the state in controlling the
environment).
24. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413.
25. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (corporations cannot be
deprived of speech rights simply because they are corporations); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,
394 (1962) (sheriff cannot be deprived of speech rights simply because of position).
26. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 409 (prison); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (school).
27. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413.
28. See Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
29. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 (1982).
30. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976).
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B. Sheppard and the Birth of the Anti-Publicity Measures
Lower courts and professional bodies have often looked to the
Court's opinion in Sheppard v. Maxwell3 1 for guidance in addressing
the conflict between free speech and fair trials. In Sheppard, the Court
examined a trial that local publicity had turned into a carnival.32
After overturning the defendant's conviction because he did not
receive a fair trial consistent with due process,33 the Court suggested,
in dicta, several approaches the trial judge could have tried to insure
impartiality. Two passages stand out. First, among a long list of non-
speech restrictive measures the trial judge could have employed, the
Court suggested a proscription on "extrajudicial statements by any
lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial
matters."34 Second, the Court proposed that the best protections
against a violation of impartiality were preventative and pointed to
attorneys, stating that "[c]ollaboration between counsel and the press
as to information affecting the fairness of the trial is not only subject to
regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures."
35
C. The Anti-Publicity Measures
Lower courts and state bar associations quickly responded to Shep-
pard and attempted to implement the Court's dicta.36 The responses
to Sheppard took two distinct, but intertwined, forms. First, courts
employed judicial orders in individual cases, to prevent the release of
prejudicial information by either the press or by trial participants
("gag orders"). Second, state bars created professional disciplinary
rules to regulate the conduct of attorneys dealing with trial publicity
("no comment rules").
31. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
32. The local media used the investigation and subsequent trial of Dr. Sheppard to feed the
public daily stories of murder, mystery, society, sex, and suspense, most of which were never
introduced into evidence in court and all of which were available to the jurors. Even the jurors
themselves became celebrities. Id. at 358.
33. Id. at 335.
34. Id. at 361.
35. Id. at 363.
36. Importantly, the Sheppard opinion discussed neither how the bench and bar should
implement these suggestions nor how these measures relate to others like continuance, change of
venue, sequestration of the jury, and new trials that do not impinge upon the speech rights of the
media and attorneys.
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L Judicial Gag Orders
Courts have developed two types of gag orders to stop prejudicial
publicity. The Supreme Court quickly adressed the first, orders
directed at the media, and virtually eliminated their use by adopting a
strict clear and present danger standard. The second type of gag
order, injunctions directed at trial participants, has split the circuit
courts of appeal.
a. Judicial Orders Gagging the Press
Gag orders directed at the press did not survive long after Sheppard.
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,37 a unanimous Court declared that
gag orders directed at the media breached the First Amendment pro-
tection of speech, thereby circumscribing the Court's sweeping lan-
guage in Sheppard. Citing the heavy presumption against the validity
of prior restraints,38 the majority opinion concluded that a direct gag
order on the press could only be valid if the particular circumstances
presented a clear and present danger of prejudice to a fair trial, less
restrictive alternatives were unavailable, and the gag order was an
effective solution. 9 The high showing of probability required by the
clear and present danger standard in the Nebraska Press decision effec-
tively ended direct restraints on the media.'
b. Judicial Orders Gagging Trial Participants
The Court, in Nebraska Press, left open the possible validity of gag
orders on trial participants.41 This has led many courts to turn to
such orders in highly publicized cases.4 2 These orders attempt to cut
off prejudicial publicity at its source, often identified as the trial attor-
neys.43 While functioning as a direct restraint on the speech of attor-
neys, trial participant gag orders also act as indirect restraints on the
press, drying up their richest sources of information. This dual effect,
along with the inconclusive dicta from Sheppard and Nebraska Press,
37. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For a wide-ranging discussion of the impact of this case see
Symposium: Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1977).
38. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
39. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562.
40. Sheryl A. Bjork, Comment, Indirect Gag Orders and the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 44 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 165, 174 (1989).
41. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 565 n.8.
42. Bjork, supra note 40, at 166.
43. E.g., Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 601 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Vol. 67:733, 1992
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has led to a split among the circuit courts regarding the constitutional-
ity of gag orders on trial participants. 4
The circuit courts have wrestled with two standards in deciding
when the danger of prejudice is grave enough to justify suppressing
trial participants' speech.4" Courts articulate the first standard either
as a "clear and present danger"'  or a "serious and imminent
threat."'47 Courts choosing this standard only uphold trial participant
gag orders that restrict speech presenting a clear and present danger of
prejudice to a fair trial. Application of this standard does not require
proof of actual prejudice, but rather requires a showing of a near cer-
tainty of potential for prejudice. This standard approximates the strict
scrutiny of speech restrictions found in Nebraska Press.4"
Other courts have articulated a "reasonable likelihood" standard.49
Relying on the dicta from Sheppard, 0 courts choosing this standard
uphold trial participant gag orders that restrict speech presenting only
a reasonable likelihood of prejudice to a fair trial. The decisions
employing this standard often note the futility of predicting prejudice
with any certainty, and instead focus on the possibility of prejudice.5"
44. Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 488 U.S. 946 (1988) (White, J., dissenting to denial of cert.).
The split has led to a healthy debate among commentators. Cf Bjork, supra note 40 (asserting
that trial participant gag orders are indirect restraints on the media and make Nebraska Press
gutless); Mark R. Stabile, Comment, Free Press--Fair Triab Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly
Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEo. L.J. 337 (1990) (arguing that there is a constitutional
distinction between gag orders on the media and gag orders on trial participants); Michael E.
Swartz, Note, Trial Participant Speech Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment Rights, 90
COLUM. L. Rlv. 1411 (1990) (arguing that trial participant gag orders should only be upheld on
a showing of clear and present danger rather than a reasonable likelihood of danger to a fair
trial).
45. At least one court has hinted that the only difference between the standards may be
semantics. Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 240 (Ct. App. 1973). But see Swartz, supra
note 44, at 1414 n.25. The circuit courts also disagree on whether to apply different standards
based on the status of the party challenging the gag order. See Stabile, supra note 44.
46. See, eg., Bailey v. Systems Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 1988).
47. See, eg., United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1987); Levine v. United States
Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). For an
equivalent standard formulated as "clear and imminent danger," see CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522
F.2d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 1975).
48. At least one court has treated "clear and present danger" and "serious and imminent
threat" as distinguishable standards, thus finding three from which to choose. In re Keller, 693
P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1984); see also Dianne Pappas, Comment, First Amendment Protection of
Criminal Defense Attorneys' Extrajudicial Statements in the Decade Since Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart, 8 WHrrIER L. REv. 1021, 1028-37 (1987).
49. See, eg., United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 396 U.S. 990
(1969).
50. The words "reasonable likelihood" are actually used in evaluating a motion for
continuance or change of venue. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
51. See Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 242 (Ct. App. 1973).
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These courts limit Nebraska Press to its facts, refusing to extend a high
level of speech protection to lawyers or other trial participants.
2. Attorney Disciplinary Rules
State bars were generally unsuccessful in their first response to the
Sheppard dicta, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-107.52 A recommendation
of the American Bar Association (ABA), the rule took a "lists
approach" to the problem of extrajudicial speech, prohibiting many
specific categories of statements by attorneys while permitting
others.53 In several subsections, the rule applied a blanket standard
prohibiting comment on matters "reasonably likely" to interfere with
fair proceedings. 4 Courts split on the constitutionality of the reason-
able likelihood standard in DR 7-107, but most found at least one sec-
tion of the rule overbroad or vague.55
The ABA responded quickly to the judicial criticism, commission-
ing a redrafting of DR 7-107 to cure its constitutional defects.56 The
ABA adopted the resulting proposal, Model Rule 3.6,11 with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. TIhe biggest change
from DR 7-107 in the new rule is the generalization of the standard in
section (a) of Model Rule 3.6, prohibiting public comments by attor-
neys that have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" a
52. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1980) (hereinafter MODEL
CODE). See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.6:102 (1990).
53. HAZARD, supra note 52, at 665.
54. MODEL CODE, supra note 52, at DR 7-107(D), (E), G(5), H(5).
55. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (upholding constitutionality of
reasonable likelihood standard as applied to criminal jury trials, but holding other clauses vague
or overbroad); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that
only a "serious and imminent threat" standard could be constitutional and that several clauses of
DR 7-107 are overbroad or vague), cert denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
56. HAZARD, supra note 52, at 665.
57. Model Rule 3.6 reads as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding.
(b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) ordinarily is likely to have such an effect
when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, cr any other proceeding
that could result in incarceration, and the statement relates to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a
criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a
party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a
plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or
740
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judicial proceeding.58 The drafters intended this standard to approxi-
mate the clear and present danger test regarding speech. 9 In addi-
tion, section (b) of Model Rule 3.6 simplifies the lists of prohibited
statements and recasts them as presumptions of prejudicial comments.
Section (c) transforms the lists of permitted statements from DR 7-107
into a safe harbor clause," listing categories of statements that lawyers
may make notwithstanding the first two sections. The state bars have
slowly changed their codes of professional conduct to conform to the
statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a
statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a
person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence
expected to be presented-,
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or
proceeding that could result in incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible
as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an
impartial trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included
therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the
defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b)(l-5), a lawyer involved in the investigation
or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(1) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the general scope of the
investigation, the offense or claim or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law,
the identity of the persons involved;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is
reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to
the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in
apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the
investigation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 3.6 (1983).
58. Id.
59. See HAZARD, supra note 52, at 666; Michael R. Scheurich, Note, The Attorney "No-
Comment" Rules and the First Amendment, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 61, 80 (1979). Hazard explains
that "the danger of prejudice to a proceeding must be clear (material) and present (substantially
likely)." HAZARD, supra, at 668.
60. See HAZARD, supra note 52, at 675.
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new rule.6 1 Model Rule 3.6 remained untested in the courts until
Dominic Gentile challenged his disciplinary sanctions.
II. GENTILE V STATE BAR
In two opposing opinions written by Justice Kennedy and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist in Gentile v. State Bar,62 a shifting majority of the
Supreme Court cleared Gentile of the reprimand he received after
holding the pretrial press conference. The Court, however, upheld the
substantive standard articulated in Nevada Supreme Court Rule
177.63 Justice O'Connor provided the swing vote, voting for the por-
tions of Justice Kennedy's opinion that reversed the Nevada Supreme
Court and declared section (c) of Rule 177 void for vagueness. How-
ever, O'Connor also voted with the Chief Justice and Justices White,
Scalia, and Souter to uphold the constitutionality of standards that
provide less protection for attorney speech than would a clear and
present danger test.64
A. The Vagueness of the Safe Harbor Clause
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Kennedy, voided
Rule 177 for vagueness because the word "notwithstanding" in section
(c) could mislead attorneys into believing that they could violate sec-
tions (a) and (b) without fear of discipline. The Court concluded that
the safe harbor provisions of Rule 177(c) set a trap for the unwary and
created a risk of discriminatory enforcement.65 Gentile's earnest but
unsuccessful attempt to obey the rule, Kennedy noted, demonstrated
this concern.66
61. Thirty-two states have adopted a form of Model Rule 3.6. Eleven states have retained
DR 7-107. Five states have adopted rules with a "serious and imminent threat" standard. Only
Virginia has explicitly adopted a "clear and present danger" standard. California's Rules of
Professional Conduct have no provision for trial publicity. See Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct.
2720, 2741 (1991); see also ALABAMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991).
62. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). See supra text accompanying notes 1-6 for the facts of the case.
63. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2748-49. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is identical to Model
Rule 3.6 in all relevant aspects. Both Rehnquist and Kennedy assumed without discussion,
however, that the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard as applied by the
Nevada Supreme Court restricted more speech than the "clear and present danger" standard.
See id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J.), 2741-42 (Rehnquist, C.J.). But see supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
64. Justice O'Connor explained her split vote in a brief concurrin- opinion. Gentile, 111 S.
Ct. at 2748.
65. Id. at 2731. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 2731-32. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from this conclusion and found that
Rule 177 was not vague. Rehnquist pointed to Gentile's admission zt the disciplinary hearing
that he intended to influence public opinion. Such intent, Rehnquist asserted, was an attempt to
742
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B. The Level of First Amendment Protection for Attorneys
1. The Rehnquist View
Writing for a separate majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist went fur-
ther than the vagueness issue and upheld the standard employed by
Model Rule 3.6. Rehnquist began by offering five reasons why attor-
ney speech fit into a category subject to diminished protection.67 First,
ethical codes for attorneys have always had a provision restricting
comments members of the bar may make to the press.6 8 Second, most
states currently have trial publicity rules that restrict attorney
speech.69 Third, court rules circumscribe attorney speech within a
courtroom.70  Fourth, decisions considering trial publicity in other
contexts have often contained statements suggesting that attorney
speech may be regulated.71 And fifth, decisions concerning a lawyer's
right to advertise or solicit business have not given attorneys blanket
speech protection. 72 Based on this evidence, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded, the clear and present danger standard is unnecessary in
evaluating restrictions on lawyers' comments to the media.
Rehnquist then applied the two-prong compelling government
interests test73 to uphold the constitutionality of the Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 177. First, Rehnquist concluded that the state's interest
in providing fair trials is substantial and important enough to uphold
this regulation.74 Second, Rehnquist found that Rule 177 is narrowly
tailored to meet that objective because the "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" standard sufficiently circumscribes the comments
that are prohibited.75
violate section (a) and not an attempt to rely on the safe harbor section. Id. at 2746-47
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
67. See supra text accompanying note 23.
68. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2740-41.
69. Id at 2741.
70. Id at 2743.
71. Id at 2743-44. Rehnquist specifically highlighted portions ofIn re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622
(1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (discussed at supra text accompanying
notes 31-35). Sawyer involved the discipline of an attorney involved in Smith Act prosecutions
in Hawaii. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 623. A majority of the Sawyer Court reversed the discipline
because the facts did not support the finding that the attorney's comments to a reporter
impugned the fairness and integrity of the judge involved in the trial. Id. at 626. However, in
two separate opinions, five justices hinted in dicta that the First Amendment does not exempt
attorney comments to the press from proven charges of attempting to interfere with a fair trial.
Id. at 646-47 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result), 666-67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
72. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
74. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
75. Id.
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2. The Kennedy View
Justice Kennedy argued in dissent that attorney speech should not
be subject to diminished protection.76 Like Gentile's claims of police
corruption, Kennedy argued, attorney speech is often classic political
speech going to the heart of First Amendment protection." Kennedy
distinguished the cases relied upon by Rehnquist, stressing that they
involved either commercial speech7" or information that an attorney
could receive only through discovery, 79 not political commentary on
the administration of justice. Kennedy concluded that without a justi-
fication for downgrading protection of attorney speech, the Court
should not go further and apply the compelling government interests
test.
Even if the balancing test were appropriate, Kennedy argued, Rule
177 fails the first prong because the state cannot show that the danger
of prejudice due to attorney comments is grave enough to justify the
restrictions on free speech.8" Disagreeing with Relmquist on the mag-
nitude of the danger, Kennedy noted that few extrajudicial comments
pose a risk of prejudice to a trial.81 In addition, Kennedy continued,
any special danger presented by the status of the speaker as an attor-
ney is balanced by that speaker's value to the public as a unique source
of information on the judicial system.
III. STATES SHOULD REJECT THE GENTILE ANALYSIS
Notwithstanding the Court's decision to void Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 177 because of vagueness, states should reject the more
restrictive speech standard approved by the Court in Gentile. In addi-
tion to the arguments set forth in Justice Kennedy's dissent, three
flaws undermine the analysis offered by the Rehnquist majority. First,
the compelling government interests test is unnecessary because the
Court's evidence fails to justify diminished speech protection for attor-
neys. Second, assuming that the compelling government interests test
is appropriate, the Court's application of the second prong fails to
establish that the speech restrictions of Model Rule 3.6 are the least
restrictive means necessary to remedy the danger of prejudice. Third,
the Court's analysis fails to recognize that the blanket prohibition in
76. Id. at 2733-35.
77. Id. at 2724-25.
78. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
79. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
80. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2735 (Kennedy, J.).
81. Id. at 2734.
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Model Rule 3.6 is overbroad in treating all attorney speech as equally
dangerous. In response to the Court's weak analysis, states should
interpret their disciplinary rules as approximating a clear and present
danger test and exclude criminal defense counsel and attorneys
involved in civil litigation. In addition, states should encourage the
use of procedural remedies to sidestep the threat of prejudice and max-
imize the benefits of attorney involvement in trial publicity.
A. Flaws in the Court's Analysis
The Court's analysis, as offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, fails in
three respects. First, Rehnquist fails to support a constitutional dis-
tinction between attorney speech and that of the press or public. Sec-
ond, Model Rule 3.6 is not the least restrictive means to reach the
state's interest in protecting impartiality. Third, Rehnquist fails to
consider the overbreadth of Model Rule 3.6 in light of the diminshed
risk of prejudice presented by criminal defense counsel and the dimin-
shed interest in protection presented by civil attorneys.
L Attorneys Are Not Constitutionally Inferior
The Court's first conclusion, that attorneys should be granted less
speech protection than the press, rests on the unsupported proposition
that lawyers may be punished for extrajudicial comments solely
because of their status as lawyers.8" Two of Rehnquist's arguments for
diminished protection, the history and prevalence of trial publicity
speech restrictions on lawyers, merely support the tradition and popu-
larity of speech restrictions, but do not establish the level of protec-
tions given attorney speech. In addition, the dicta from the fair trial
opinions, Sheppard 83 and Nebraska Press, 84 only support the proposi-
tion that attorney comments may be regulated, but do not bear on the
scope of such regulations.85 Rehnquist's analogies to speech in the
courtroom and in advertisements similarly establish that attorney
speech protection is not absolute, but fail to distinguish extrajudicial
82. While this proposition would get much support from the general public, courts and
commentators have rejected restrictions on speakers based on the speaker's status alone. See,
eg., In re Conduct of Lasswell, 673 P.2d 855, 857 (Or. 1983); Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An
Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney- Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REv. 1003, 1023-24
(1984); Pappas, supra note 48, at 1027-28.
83. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
84. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
85. Justice Stewart's dictum in Sawyer is somewhat more helpful for Rehnquist's analysis.
Stewart suggested that professional conduct rules may "require abstention from what in other
circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech." In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47
(1959) (Stewart, J., concurring). Stewart's opinion, however, garnered only one vote.
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comments of attorneys from those of the press or public. Each of the
Court's arguments, thus, approve some level of regulation on attorney
speech. These arguments fail, however, to establish whether this level
is above or below the clear and present danger level generally applica-
ble to the press and public.
2. Model Rule 3.6 Is Not the Least Restrictive Remedy
Assuming for argument that attorney speech is entitled to dimin-
ished protection, Model Rule 3.6 does not fulfill the second prong of
the compelling government interests test: that the speech restrictions
be narrowly tailored to the interest presented.86 In particular, the
Court failed to appreciate the ability of alternatives to Model Rule 3.6
to remedy the danger presented by attorney comments.87 Three alter-
natives to the rule approved by the Rehnquist majority could limit
prejudicial publicity while allowing greater freedom of speech for
attorneys. First, disciplinary rules employing a clear and present dan-
ger test would permit more speech than the rule approved by Gentile,
but would still punish speech that threatened a fair trial. Second, pro-
cedural remedies available to the parties and the trial judge allow a
means of thwarting prejudice to trials without restricting attorney
speech. Third, judicial gag orders restrict speech on an ad hoc basis,
instead of chilling the speech of all attorneys. Each of these alterna-
tives is preferable to Model Rule 3.6.
The first alternative, substituting a clear and present danger test for
the Nevada Supreme Court's interpretation of "substantial likelihood
of material prejudice," still restricts dangerous speech. This standard
would only require a greater magnitude and proximity of prejudice
before disciplinary sanctions could issue. For example, a state inter-
preting its disciplinary rule as a clear and present danger test may still
sanction an attorney for releasing prejudicial information to the public
on the eve of jury selection, because the danger of prejudice would be
both serious and imminent.88 The clear and present danger interpreta-
tion, however, would not allow a state to discipline an attorney who
speaks to the press long before jury selection, when the threat of preju-
86. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
87. The danger of prejudice is not overwhelming. Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2734
(1991) (Kennedy, J.). See Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary
Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 35 (1989); Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press
Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 515, 528 (1977).
88. See Gentile, IlI S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J.); United States v. Bingham, 769 F. Supp.
1039, 1044-45 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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dice to the trial is still speculative. The significance of time is demon-
strated by the facts in Gentile, where six months was sufficient lead
time to dissipate the threat of prejudice to Grady Sanders' trial, yet
accomplished Gentile's goal of balancing the one-sided publicity so
harmful to his client.89
Additionally, Supreme Court precedents considering trial publicity
have repeatedly recommended procedural remedies as an alternative
way to safeguard impartiality. 9° For example, a continuance allows
the fervor surrounding high-proffle cases to subside, often leaving a
more dispassionate atmosphere for the trial. Similarly, a change of
venue transfers a case to a dispassionate community when the risk of
prejudice is limited to one locality. Searching voir dire by the judge
and competent counsel filters out prejudicial jurors from the panel.
Finally, once an impartial jury is selected, sequestration can eliminate
the danger by restricting juror access to potentially prejudicial infor-
mation. Each of these remedies, whether used individually or in con-
cert, minimizes the risk of a trial tainted by prejudice, without
trampling on free speech protection.91
Even a gag order on trial participants, regardless of the substantive
standard applied by the judge, is potentially less speech restrictive
than Model Rule 3.6.92 Gag orders can be tailored to fit individual
cases, minimizing the danger of overbreadth. In addition, gag orders
grant courts the opportunity to hold an adversarial hearing and take
evidence on the extent and nature of the publicity involved, the danger
of prejudice, the appropriate standard the court should apply, and the
impact of the speech restriction on the press and public interests.93
The clear and present danger standard, procedural remedies, and ad
hoc gag orders are all less restrictive of speech than Model Rule 3.6.
The Court has specifically endorsed these remedies in prior deci-
89. Gentile, I 11 S. Ct. at 2730 (Kennedy, J.).
90. See, ag., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). Justice Brennan strongly endorsed rigorous voir dire and
commented that along with continuance, change of venue and reversal on appeal, these measures
may be enough to protect impartiality in any trial. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 602-04 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
91. Critics of these remedies claim that they exact a high toll in time and money from the
court. See, ag., Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745. However, this objection effectively puts a price on
attorneys' free speech rights. See Swift, supra note 82, at 1049-51, for a discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of each procedural remedy.
92. See Swift, supra note 82, at 1051-54. But see Swartz, supra note 44, at 1440 n.215.
93. The Court has clearly demonstrated a preference for ad hoc rather than permanent
restrictions. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510-13 (1984); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982).
Washington Law Review
sions.94 By failing to consider the ability of these alternatives to mini-
mize prejudice while maximizing speech protection, Gentile represents
a relaxation of the Court's protection of free speech.
3. All Attorney Publicity Is Not the Same
The Court's analysis also sidesteps the issue of overbreadth. By
assuming that the danger of extrajudicial comments does not vary
with the status of the attorney or the type of judicial proceeding,
Model Rule 3.6 prohibits speech that does not present a danger of
unconstitutional prejudice. Such an indiscriminate sweep creates
unconstitutional overbreadth when Model Rule 3.6 is applied to
defense counsel and to civil trials.
Model Rule 3.6 fails to account for the difference between criminal
defense counsel and prosecutors.95 The Sixth Amendment only guar-
antees a fair trial to criminal defendants. The Constitution does not
extend this protection to prosecutors.9 6 This differentiation is rational
because criminal defense attorneys are less likely -to be the source of
prejudice to their own clients. As a result, their comments rarely vio-
late the Constitution's fair trial guarantee. Furthermore, as Justice
Kennedy correctly noted, the vagueness issue cuts especially hard
against criminal defense attorneys. The risk of discrimin atory enforce-
ment is greatest for the class of attorneys whose professional mission is
to challenge the government's actions.9 7
On a practical level, the danger of prejudice from prosecutors is
greater because the press tends to depend on the prosecution and other
agents of the government for their information.98 Prosecutorial
sources are usually available from the beginning of the case, and often
develop long-term relationships with the media through repeated con-
tact in different cases. Despite a traditional reputation as a govern-
94. See supra notes 90, 93.
95. Accord Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2734-35; Monroe H. Freedman & Susan Kahan, Restrictions
on Trial Publicity by Defendants and Defense Lawyers, in 3A CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
Chapter 63, § 63.04 (Steven W. Allen et al. eds., 1979); Max D. Stem. The Right of the Accused
to a Public Defense, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53, 120 (1983); Swift, supra note 82, at 1005
n.13; Sally R. Weaver, Note, Judicial Restrictions on Attorneys' Speech Concerning Pending
Litigation: Reconciling the Rights to Fair Trial and Freedom of Speech, 33 VAND. L. REv. 499,
514 (1980). But see Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 24-2, 250-51 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cerL
denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
96. The Sixth Amendment is personal to the criminal defendant. Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 848 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Susan BandeE, Taking Some Rights Too
Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1024-30 (1987).
97. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2732.
98. See Drechsel, supra note 87, at 26.
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ment watchdog, the press also tends to favor the prosecution's
perspective on fighting crime.99 Quite simply, sympathizing with
alleged murderers, rapists, and drug dealers does not sell newspapers
or television commercials.
Model Rule 3.6 also fails to account for the difference between civil
and criminal trials. On a constitutional level, the difference between
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an "impartial jury" for criminal
trials1" and the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a "trial by jury"
for civil trials101 suggests a diminished risk of a constitutional viola-
tion by publicity in a civil trial. 0 2 Moreover, the longer length of civil
trials may postpone attorney comment longer than a criminal adjudi-
cation, perhaps past the attention span of the public.103
In addition to the diminished risk of unconstitutional prejudice, the
public policy questions involved in many civil actions heighten the
concern for protection of political expression." 4 Political action
groups like the ACLU or NAACP use civil trials as an element of a
long term strategy to influence national politics. Other political activ-
ists often file class actions and private attorney general suits to make a
political statement. Thus, the comments of the attorneys working on
these suits may be classic political speech-the heart of the First
Amendment's protection.
B. A Proposed Response to Gentile
States should take the opportunity created by Gentile to reconsider
their trial publicity rules. The unconstitutionality of the safe harbor
provision mandates at least the elimination of the word "notwith-
standing" from section (c) of Model Rule 3.6 to clarify the status of
the list of safe statements. 105 While considering this change, states
should also respond to the weaknesses in the Court's analysis by refus-
ing to restrict attorney speech to the full extent allowed by Gentile.
Although the Court's decision permits states to restrict the speech of
attorneys more readily than the press or public, Gentile does not man-
date this result. The Gentile decision only sets the minimum constitu-
99. Id.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
101. Id. amend. VII.
102. See supra text accompanying note 14.
103. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257-59 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
104. See Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 373; Bauer, 522 F.2d at 257-59; Ruggieri v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp., 503 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (D.R.I. 1980).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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tional standard. States are free to offer speech protection beyond that
approved by the Court.
States should recognize the value of attorney speech and encourage
a comprehensive approach to trial publicity. This response should
include the interpretation of professional disciplinary rules to conform
with the clear and present danger standard. States should also reform
such rules to account for the smaller risk of unconstitutional prejudice
presented by criminal defense lawyers and civil litigators. Finally,
states should encourage the use of alternatives to disciplinary rules
that are less restrictive of speech.
1. States Should Adopt the Clear and Present Danger Standard
States should mandate that trial publicity rules employ clear and
present danger principles. The clear and present danger syntax itself is
not magic, as long as the states apply the correct principles."°
Rewriting the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard
may be unnecessary if state courts interpret the current standard in
line with the clear and present danger principles on which the original
drafters relied."l 7 The clear and present danger standard establishes a
minimum for attorney behavior that both encourages political speech
and protects fair trial interests. Although generally more protective of
speech, this standard still allows punishment for truly dangerous
speech. 1o8
2. States Should Account for Varying Levels of Danger
In reconsidering their disciplinary rules, states should also remedy
the failure of Model Rule 3.6 to account for the differing levels of dan-
ger to fair trials. States should exempt criminal defense counsel from
the coverage of trial publicity rules."° This change recognizes the
constitutional and real-world differences between the threat presented
by criminal defense counsel and prosecutors. States should also
account for the differences between the civil and criminal trials by
restricting application of trial publicity rules to criminal trials. Other
portions of state professional conduct codes will continue to restrict
the release of confidential information by criminal defense counsel and
civil litigators. Trial strategy may also limit the comments these attor-
106. See Gentile v. State Bar, I11 S. Ct. 2720, 2725 (1991) (Kennedy, J.); see, e.g., ALABAMA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991).
107. See supra text accompanying note 58.
108. See supra text accompanying note 88.
109. Vermont has exempted criminal defense counsel from at least a portion of its trial
publicity rule. In re Axelrod, 549 A.2d 653 (Vt. 1988).
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neys may make to the media. These proposed reforms properly scale
speech restrictions to the demonstrated threat of unconstitutional
prejudice.
3. States Should Encourage Less Restrictive Alternatives
States should not consider professional disciplinary rules as the first
line of defense against the danger of prejudice to trials. While states
should encourage judges to raise the issue of procedural remedies sua
sponte, states should also encourage attorneys, who may be more
aware of the potential for prejudice, to move quickly in requesting
such remedies. States can create the impetus for these remedies by
directing disciplinary boards to consider their use or non-use in delib-
erating abuses of trial publicity. States should encourage procedural
remedies such as continuance, change of venue, rigorous voir dire, and
sequestration because they are less restrictive of speech than a blanket
disciplinary rule.110 In extreme cases, when procedural remedies and
the threat of disciplinary sanctions under a clear and present danger
standard are insufficient, courts could employ gag orders on lawyers.
Although restrictive of attorney speech, such ad hoe orders are more
protective of attorney speech than imposing a blanket restriction on
the entire state bar.1"1
C. Attorney Comments Can Benefit Courts and Clients
Adoption of the proposed response will maximize the opportunity
for attorney speech while respecting the need to protect the impartial-
ity of adjudicative proceedings. This proposal does not deny that
attorney-generated publicity can seriously compromise the integrity of
the judicial system by prejudicing a fair trial. However, the standard
approved by the Court in Gentile is not the only, nor is it the best,
remedy to this danger. Extending the protection of speech beyond the
level approved by the Court in Gentile will accrue important benefits
for the judicial system and for clients.
Extrajudicial comments by attorneys benefit the administration of
justice in several ways. Trial publicity provided by attorneys may
encourage witnesses to come forward. I 2 In addition, the participation
of attorneys in a media campaign may encourage public entities and
large institutional defendants interested in protecting a public image to
engage in settlement negotiations, quickening the speed of justice and
110. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
112. See Stem, supra note.95, at 100.
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decreasing the backlog of cases in the courts. 113  Attorneys are also
unique sources of information about the court system and about the
particular cases on which they are working.114 By commenting on liti-
gation through the media while the topic has the fickle attention of the
public, attorneys aid in the understanding of the judicial system, con-
tributing to the legitimacy of the courts.
Just as the state benefits from the extrajudicial ccmments of lawyers
to the press, clients may also benefit from attorney publicity. Often,
attorneys are the most eloquent spokespersons for defendants who do
not know when or how to speak to the press or cannot speak without
jeopardizing their defense." 5 Public appeals by attorneys on behalf of
their clients may also help raise the funds necessary for the defense,
appeal, or posting of a bond." 6
With the adoption of more liberal trial publicity rules, lawyers may
come to the realization that extrajudicial comments to the press are
not the sole domain of attorneys seeking notoriety for themselves. Jus-
tice Kennedy's comments in Gentile imply that publicity should be
viewed as an alternative to litigation within the traditional role of
attorneys. 117 For clients frustrated by high attorney fees, the use of
publicity to avoid litigation may shorten the lifespan, and thus the
cost, of a case. Such an approach admittedly runs the risk of trying a
case in public. However, this alternative should be the choice of a
113. See Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2728-29 (1991) (Kennedy, J.).
114. See Swift supra note 82, at 1027-28. The Court has indicated that an attorney's special
knowledge may trigger a special duty. "Certainly courts are not, and cannot be, immune from
criticism, and lawyers, of course, may indulge in criticism. Indeed, they are under a special
responsibility to exercise fearlessness in doing so." In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 669 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
115. "[A] defendant cannot speak without fear of incriminating himself and prejudicing his
defense, and most criminal defendants have insufficient means to retain a public relations team
apart from defense counsel for the sole purpose of countering prosecution statements." Gentile,
111 S. Ct. at 2735 (Kennedy, J.).
116. See Stern, supra note 95, at 99-100; MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' Em-ics 229 (1990).
117. Kennedy noted:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. He cr she cannot ignore the
practical implications of a legal proceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may
recommend a plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the adverse consequences of a possible
loss after trial, so too an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's reputation
and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of a prosecution
deemed unjust or commenced with improper motives. A defense attorney may pursue
lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an
attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve to be
tried.
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2728-29 (Kennedy, J.).
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well-informed client, not the choice of overly restrictive and unconsti-
tutional codes of conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court cleared Dominic Gentile of disciplinary charges
for his role in exposing police corruption. However, the Court was
shortsighted in allowing greater speech restrictions on attorneys than
the press or public. Punishing lawyers for their service to the courts
repudiates the dynamic role attorneys have played, and should con-
tinue to play, as actors in our judicial and political system. Further-
more, the direct benefits of attorney-generated publicity to the courts
and clients point to a standard that allows the maximum protection
for speech under the First Amendment. Thus, states reconsidering
their codes of professional conduct in response to Gentile should
decline to regulate attorney speech to the full extent allowed by the
Court. Instead, states should interpret their trial publicity rules in
light of clear and present danger principles, account for the varying
threats of different attorney comments, and encourage the use of less
restrictive alternatives.
